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Summary 
Public pension plans in the United States have $3.8 trillion of invested assets, more than two-
thirds of which are in equities and similar assets. Unlike private pension funds, public pension 
funds have increased their equity allocations dramatically over the last two decades, making 
their investment returns and unexpected investment gains and losses far more volatile than 
before. This means that plan funded status and contributions requested of governments also 
are more volatile than before, increasing the risks to taxpayers, stakeholders in government 
services and investments, and workers and retirees. 
 
One important way to examine the impact of investment-return volatility upon plan funded 
status and contributions is with a stochastic simulation model that draws investment returns 
from a probability distribution. We have constructed a pension simulation does that, and we 
use it to examine the interplay between investment return volatility and funding policy, and to 
examine the potential consequences of different investment return environments. 
 
Investment risk and funding policies. 
The most-common funding policies and practices reduce contribution volatility at the same 
time that they increase the likelihood of severe underfunding. These policies are unlikely to 
bring underfunded plans to full funding within 30 years, even if investment-return assumptions 
are met every single year and employers make full actuarially determined contributions. For 
example, a 75 percent funded plan using a common policy of 30-year open amortization as a 
constant percentage of payroll, with 5-year asset smoothing, would only reach 85 percent 
funding after 30 years even if it earned 7.5 percent every year. When investment returns are 
variable, plans and their sponsors face substantial risk of potential crises: the same plan would 
face a one in six chance of falling below 40 percent funding within 30 years if its investment 
return assumption is correct on average but has a 12 percent standard deviation. If sponsors do 
not pay full actuarial contributions or if reasonable expected returns are less than 7.5 percent, 
the risk of severe underfunding would be greater. 
 
This raises important questions about the impact that pension contributions will have on state 
and local government taxes and spending, and questions about the security of pension benefits. 
When returns are good and contributions are driven downward, will governments resist the 
urge to increase benefits, or will they raise them as some have done in the past? Will they resist 
the urge to embark on other spending programs that may have to be cut in later years if returns 
are bad? When returns are bad and requested contributions are driven up sharply, will elected 
officials be willing to raise taxes and cut spending to support those contributions, or will many 
pay less than actuarially determined amounts as often has occurred previously? 
 
In the current low-interest-rate and low-inflation environment plans are taking the risk of 
substantial investment income shortfalls to have reasonable chances of achieving their 
investment return assumptions. This means that investment earnings will be particularly 
volatile and funding policy takes on greater importance. In the face of earnings volatility, plans 
can attempt to dampen contribution volatility through the smoothing methods available to 
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them, but only at the expense of making funded ratios more volatile, increasing the risk that 
pension funds will become severely underfunded and that required contribution increases will 
be politically untenable. 
 
Investment risk-taking and the changing investment-return environment 
The decline in risk-free interest rates since the 1980s and 1990s has created a very difficult 
investing environment for public pension plans. Before the decline, the typical plan could have 
achieved its investment-return assumptions while taking very little risk. As rates declined, 
public plans faced a choice: either reduce investment-return assumptions and request much 
higher contributions from governments, or maintain assumptions, avoid increasing 
contributions from governments, and take on much greater risk.  
 
For the most part, public pension funds have maintained their investment-return assumptions, 
perhaps in the belief that interest rate declines were temporary and that in the longer run high 
investment returns could again be obtained at low levels of risk. But maintaining their 
assumptions implicitly required them to invest in riskier assets. 
 
We modeled the implications of a sustained reduction in risk-free interest rates by examining a 
prototypical pension plan under three scenarios: 
■ The good old days: The pension plan can expect to earn a 7.5 percent return with very 
little investment-return volatility, or risk. This is similar to what plans might have been 
able to achieve two or three decades ago. As the name implies, pension plans no longer 
have this beneficial choice available. 
■ Invest in riskier assets: In response to declining risk-free rates, the pension plan 
maintains a 7.5 percent earnings assumption but invests in riskier assets. Even though it 
can expect a long-run compound return of 7.5 percent, some years will be much higher 
and some will be much lower. Our measure of investment-return volatility, the standard 
deviation, is 12 percent in this scenario. This is similar to what many public pension 
plans did as risk-free rates fell. 
■ Lower assumed return: In this scenario, instead of investing in risker assets in response 
to declining risk-free rates, the pension plan lowers its earnings assumption to 3.5 
percent and remains invested in relatively low-risk assets, with a standard deviation of 
1.8 percent. This forces the plan to raise contributions from governments. For the most 
part, public pension plans have not done this (although they have raised contributions in 
response to investment shortfalls). Lowering risk and raising contributions remains an 
option. 
 
Pension plans were not limited to one response or the other – they could have chosen to be in-
between. 
 
We modeled the finances of our prototypical pension fund over 30 years, assuming that 
employers pay full actuarially determined contributions. Our analysis shows that plans faced a 
fundamental trade-off: If they invested in riskier assets, the risk to the pension fund would 
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increase significantly but government contributions would remain low. The riskier-assets 
scenario resulted in a 16.9 percent probability for our prototypical plan that plan funding would 
fall below 40 percent sometime during the 30 years – a level that has been associated with 
crises in several states. If instead the plan lowered assumed investment returns, the risk to the 
pension fund would remain minimal, but employer contributions would have to triple, and 
would stay high for all 30 years of the simulation period. This dramatic increase in required 
contributions may go a long way toward explaining why plans have taken on increased 
investment risk. 
 
We also examined what would happen if plan earnings assumptions, which are in the range of 7 
to 8 percent for most plans, are too optimistic, as some professional market forecasts suggest. 
We simulated a scenario in which the true expected compound return is 1.5 percentage points 
lower than the assumed return of 7.5 percent. In that scenario the plan has a more than a one 
in three chance of experiencing severe underfunding at some point over the next 30 years, 
which is more than twice as high as when the investment earnings assumption is met. Employer 
contributions as a percentage of payroll would be expected to rise substantially over time, 
whereas if the return assumption is met they would fall over time; by the end of 30 years, the 
median employer contributions in this scenario are almost 50 percent higher than when 
investment return assumptions are met. 
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Introduction 
Public pension plans in the United States have $3.8 trillion of invested assets, more than two-
thirds of which are in equities and similar assets. Unlike private pension funds, public pension 
funds have increased their equity allocations dramatically over the last two decades, making 
their investment returns and unexpected investment gains and losses far more volatile than 
before. This means that plan funded status and contributions requested of governments also 
are more volatile than before, increasing the risks to taxpayers, stakeholders in government 
services and investments, and workers and retirees. 
 
Relatively little has been written on public pension fund investment risk-taking and its potential 
consequences. The Rockefeller Institute’s Pension Simulation Project is examining these issues 
by modeling public pension fund finances stochastically, under different investment return 
scenarios and different plan funding policies. We do this by modeling several different kinds of 
prototypical plans, and by modeling specific individual plans. We have examined and quantified 
how increased investment risk-taking has increased the risk of funding crises for public pension 
plans and the risk of large increases in employer contributions. In addition, we have examined 
the extent to which different funding and contribution policies chosen by plans and their 
sponsors cause trade-offs between risks to plan funded status and risks to employer 
contributions. Finally, we have examined several topics of lesser significance, including how 
plan demographic characteristics affect the consequences of investment risk-taking. 
 
Our stochastic pension simulation model 
The simulation model 
To examine the interplay between stochastic investment returns and plan demographic 
characteristics we use a stochastic simulation model of public pension plans. The model allows 
us to examine the year-by-year dynamics of pension fund finances for plans with real-world 
characteristics, under different investment return scenarios and different funding policies. 
Starting from an initial position (e.g., 75 percent funded), it projects the future annual assets 
and cash flows, including benefit payments, employer and employee contributions, and 
investment income, based upon given model inputs. 
 
The most important model inputs include: 
• Retirement benefit rules, including the benefit multiplier per year of service, vesting 
rules, allowable retirement ages, and annual benefit percentage increase, if any (we do 
not call this a COLA, or cost-of-living-adjustment, because it does not depend on 
economic conditions). 
• Plan demographics in the initial year including number of workers by age and entry age 
and their average salaries, number of retirees by age and their average benefit, and 
projected annual growth in the workforce. 
• Decrement tables with mortality rates, retirement rates, and separation rates. 
• Salary schedules that define how worker salaries change over time and with experience. 
• Inflation and aggregate payroll growth assumptions. 
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• Actuarial rules and methods for determining actuarial liability, normal cost, and an 
actuarially determined contribution. These include the actuarial cost method (e.g., entry 
age normal), discount rate (which can be different from assumed and actual investment 
returns), asset-smoothing rules if any, and amortization rules (open or closed, level 
percent or level dollar, and length of amortization period). 
• Information to determine employee and employer contributions. For employee 
contributions, this is a fixed percentage of payroll. For employer contributions, this 
defines whether the employer pays the actuarially determined contribution, or pays 
according to some other rule such as a fixed percentage of payroll. 
• Rules or data specifying investment returns: Investment returns can be deterministic or 
stochastic.  
 
A deterministic run might have a single investment return applicable to all years (e.g., 7.5 
percent per year) or it might have a set of deterministic returns, one per year (e.g., 10 percent 
for each of the first 20 years, followed by 5 percent for each of the next 20 years). When 
investment returns are deterministic, we only run a single simulation since results will not vary 
from run to run. 
 
A stochastic run generally will draw investment returns randomly each year from a probability 
distribution – for example, from a normal distribution with an 8.22 percent mean return and a 
12 percent standard deviation.1 (More complex investment return scenarios are possible, too.) 
When we run the model with stochastic investment returns, typically we conduct 1,000 
simulations for a given set of inputs, so that we can examine the distribution of results. 
The model can be used to examine prototypical pension funds, or can be used with data for 
actual pension funds. 
 
We assume that investment returns follow the normal distribution, with a mean long-run 
compound return of 7.5 percent and a standard deviation of 12 percent. The mean is consistent 
with what the typical plan assumes today. The standard deviation is broadly consistent with our 
review of simulations and investment return analyses performed elsewhere: CalPERS used a 
12.96 percent standard deviation,2 Biggs assumed a 14 percent standard deviation,3 and 
Bonafede et al. has estimated a 12.5 percent standard deviation.4 A normal distribution with a 
standard deviation of 12 percent means that in a typical year, the pension fund has a one in six 
chance of falling at least 12 percentage points short of its investment return assumption and a 
one in six chance of exceeding its investment return assumption by at least 12 percentage 
points – the chance of rolling any single number with a fair six-sided die. With approximately 
$3.8 trillion of public pension defined benefit plan assets under investment, a 12 percent single-
year investment return shortfall is equivalent to more than $425 billion for the United States as 
a whole. 
 
Investment returns are assumed to be independent of each other from year to year – bad 
investment years are not necessarily followed by good investment years, and vice versa. 
Because investment returns are random in the model, we might obtain virtually any sequence 
of returns in a single run of the model (which we call an individual simulation), but if we run 
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enough simulations, on average the results will reflect our assumed distribution of returns (i.e., 
a mean compound annual return of 7.5 percent and a standard deviation of 12 percent). We 
run the model 1,000 times to gain insight into the likely distribution of outcomes. 
 
Measures we use to evaluate results 
We are primarily concerned about two kinds of risks:  
• Extremely low funded ratios, which create a risk to pension plans and their beneficiaries, 
and create political risks that could lead to benefit cuts, and 
• Extremely high contributions, or large increases in contributions in short periods of time, 
which pose direct risks to governments and their stakeholders, and in turn could pose 
risks to pension plans and their beneficiaries. 
 
There usually are trade-offs between these two kinds of risks. If a pension plan has a 
contribution policy designed to pay down unfunded liabilities very quickly, it is unlikely to have 
low funded ratios but it may have high contributions. If a pension plan has a contribution policy 
designed to keep contributions stable and low, there is greater risk that funded ratios may 
become very low because contributions may not increase rapidly in response to adverse 
experience. 
 
We use three primary measures to evaluate these risks: The  
 
Probability that the funded ratio will fall below 40% during the first 30 years 
When returns are stochastic, many outcomes are possible, including very extreme outcomes, so 
it does not make sense to focus on the worst outcomes or the best outcomes. We are 
particularly concerned about the risk of bad outcomes, and one useful measure is the 
probability that the funded ratio, using the market value of assets, will fall below 40 percent in 
a given time period. 
 
We choose 40 percent because it is a good indicator of a deeply troubled pension fund. In 2013, 
only four plans out of 160 in the Center for Retirement Research’s Public Plans Database had a 
funded ratio below 40 percent – the Chicago Municipal Employees and Chicago Police plans, 
the Illinois State Employees Retirement System, and the Kentucky Employees Retirement 
System. Each plan is widely recognized as being in deep trouble, with the likelihood of either 
substantial tax increases, service cuts, or benefit cuts yet to come. 
 
In the first year, this probability is near zero. In the scenarios that follow, plans start out with a 
75 percent funded ratio. Falling to 40 percent funded would require an investment shortfall of 
well over 40 percent, which is not likely in a single year. But as the time period extends, there is 
a chance of an extended period of low returns, leading to severe underfunding. This measure 
evaluates the likelihood of this occurring. 
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Probability that employer contributions will rise above 30% of payroll during the first 30 years 
Extremely high contributions can create great political and financial pressure on plan sponsors 
and may lead to benefit cuts, tax increases and crowding out of expenditures on other public 
services. We use the probability that the employer contribution will rise above 30 percent of 
payroll as of a given year to evaluate how likely it is that the plan sponsor may face the pressure 
of high contributions. As the time period extends and the chance of a long period of low returns 
rises, the probability of having a high employer contribution anytime in that period will 
increase. 
 
Probability that employer contributions will rise by more than 10% of payroll in a 5-year period 
Making contributions stable and predictable is one of the most important goals of funding 
policies from the perspective of the employer. Sharp increases in employer contributions, even 
if not large enough to threaten affordability, can cause trouble in budget planning. We use the 
probability that the employer contribution will rise by more than 10 percentage points of 
payroll in a 5-year period to measure this possibility. In some of the policies we examine, 
extremely low returns in a very short time period as may occur in a severe financial crisis may 
push up the required contribution considerably even after being dampened by asset smoothing 
and amortization policies. 
 
Investment risk and funding policy 
Public defined benefit pension funds provide retirement income for nearly 10 million 
Americans. Although the sharp stock market declines of the Great Recession are more than 
seven years in the past, public pension plans remain underfunded by approximately $1.7 trillion 
despite contribution increases,5 6 in part because the methods state and local governments use 
to address funding shortfalls typically stretch repayments out over long periods of time. 
Defined benefit pensions are deferred compensation: an employee provides services now, and 
the employer promises to pay compensation during retirement. Pre-funding these promises by 
setting aside funds in the present that, together with investment earnings, will be sufficient to 
pay benefits when due helps achieve intergenerational equity. It ensures that current taxpayers 
pay the full cost of current services, and it helps achieve benefit security by ensuring that funds 
will be available for promised pensions at the time benefits must be paid.7 Although some 
economists argue that 100 percent funding many not be an optimal goal because governments 
may enhance benefits when plans become overfunded, we assume that full funding is the 
proper goal.8 
 
Pre-funding requires the sponsoring government to make contributions each year, and funding 
policy is the set of methods and rules used to determine those contributions. As we use the 
term, “funding policy” is broader than the cost method used to allocate benefits to past and 
future service. It also includes when and how shortfalls and gains are recognized and reflected 
in contributions. Several organizations have proposed principles for funding policy. Recently, a 
panel commissioned by the Society of Actuaries (SOA) set out the following principles:9 
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• Adequacy: Contributions, together with investment income, should be sufficient to pay 
promised benefits as they come due, under a range of economic conditions. 
• Intergenerational equity: Achieving intergenerational equity requires paying the costs of 
pension benefits over employees’ working lifetimes. 
• Cost stability and predictability: All else equal, government officials generally prefer 
predictable contributions that fit well into state and local budgets. 
 
In practice, funding methods and rules consist of a discount rate used to value liabilities, 
amortization rules for taking unexpected gains and losses into account, and asset smoothing 
rules to determine when and how swings in the market values of assets are reflected in the 
calculations. These are the main elements needed to calculate actuarially determined 
contributions. In addition, the contribution behavior of governments – the choice about 
whether to pay actuarially determined contributions and the extent to which they will be paid 
— is often considered part of funding policy. 
 
Each of these elements affects the goals of adequacy, intergenerational equity, and cost 
stability. If investment returns are highly variable, a plan’s funded status and the employer’s 
contributions may be subject to large swings that depend in part on these elements of funding 
policy. Large investment shortfalls can lead to severe underfunding, and to large but lagged 
increases in actuarially determined contributions. Underfunding and contribution increases can 
stress the political system, leading to cuts in public services, tax increases, budget gimmicks, 
and calls for benefit cuts. Sharp investment gains can lead to the opposite. 
 
In this section, we examine how investment return variability interacts with funding policy to 
create the risk of severe underfunding and large increases in employer contributions, using our 
stochastic simulation model, under different funding policies. 
 
We discuss the major elements of funding policy below. 
 
Elements of funding policy 
Discount rate 
At what rate should future benefits be discounted – that is, converted to present day dollars? 
Economists have concluded that benefits should be discounted at rates that reflect the riskiness 
(or intended riskiness) of their cash flows; if pension benefits almost certainly will be paid, that 
suggests using rates based upon risk-free or nearly risk-free assets.10 There are some minor 
disagreements among economists about how, exactly, to translate this into specific market-
related rates, but there is broad agreement on the larger issue. Valuing liabilities at risk-free 
rates does not mean funds should invest only in risk-free assets; that is an entirely separate 
decision. By contrast, actuaries discount benefits based on the rate they assume will be earned 
on the pension fund’s asset portfolio, and that assumption is often based on historical returns 
rather than current market conditions.11 
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Risk-free returns have fallen substantially over the past three decades. They are lower than 
expected returns on a diversified portfolio of investments, and are far lower than the earnings 
assumed by the median pension fund, currently about 7.6 percent.12 While public pension 
funds have lowered earnings assumptions slightly, they have not come down as much as risk-
free returns have declined 
 
The choice of discount rate is a technical issue with large consequences. The lower the discount 
rate, the higher the estimate of liability. One paper concluded that liabilities of state-run 
pension plans for the U.S. as a whole were more than $2 trillion higher when discounted using 
risk-free rates.13 
 
Estimated annual costs are higher, too, when discount rates are lower. In one simple example, 
the annual “normal cost” of benefits is nearly twice as great when valued at a 6 percent 
discount rate rather than at 8 percent, and nearly four times as great when valued at a 4 
percent rate.14 If benefits were valued using risk-free or nearly risk-free rates, normal costs 
would be several multiples of actuaries’ current estimates. The Bureau of Economic Analysis 
has estimated that annual normal costs calculated at a 5 percent discount rate were $89 billion 
higher than actual employer contributions in 2013.15 Funding these costs at risk-free rates, 
which are lower than 5 percent, would have required contributions to be higher still.16 The 
higher contributions that governments would have to pay if benefits were discounted at risk-
free rates can be thought of in two ways: as an indication of how much money plans believe 
they can save their governments through successful investing, and as an indication of the 
magnitude of risk that pension fund investments entail. 
 
To fund benefits with complete security – that is, with no risk of shortfalls and with no chance 
of pushing costs off to the future - a pension fund would calculate contributions using a risk-
free rate. Given the huge increases in government contributions that would be required, that 
certainly will not happen anytime soon. 
 
Amortization methods and periods 
In addition to the discount rate, funding policies must take into account amortization, or how to 
“stretch out” repayment. Common amortization methods vary primarily along three 
dimensions: 
1. Closed or open: Closed methods use a fixed period over which to amortize liabilities – 
for example, 30 years – after which the liability is completely paid off. By contrast, open 
methods continually reset the length of the period. Under an open 30-year amortization 
method, the first payment would be calculated based on a 30-year period, but the 
second payment would be based on a new 30-year period (rather than 29 years), after 
adjusting the unpaid balance to take into account the prior payment. Closed methods 
pay off liabilities more quickly than open methods. In fact, open methods never 
completely pay down a liability, although the liability may be reduced substantially. 
2. Level dollar or level percent of payroll: Level dollar methods calculate a fixed annual 
dollar payment, similar to a home mortgage and to the way that governments ordinarily 
repay bonds issued to finance infrastructure. By contrast level percent methods 
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calculate a fixed percentage of each year’s payroll. Under the level percent method, the 
initial payment is lower than later payments, and payments are expected to grow each 
year at the same rate as payroll grows. (Payments could decline if payroll were expected 
to decline, but in practice payroll usually is assumed to grow.) Level dollar methods pay 
off liabilities more quickly than level percent methods. 
3. Length of amortization period: The longer the amortization period, the lower the 
annual payments and the longer it will take to pay off the liability. 
 
Neither the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) nor the Actuarial Standards 
Board (ASB) has authority to mandate amortization methods, but their standards and 
pronouncements do have influence. Until recently, GASB Statement 25 governed accounting for 
public pension funds and it established a maximum amortization period of 30 years for 
accounting.17 18 The successor to GASB 25, GASB 67, requires an amortization period for 
financial reporting purposes that is based on the remaining service life of all employees, 
although plans are not required to use this for funding purposes.19 In many cases this is much 
shorter than 30 years. 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution in 2013 of major public pension plans along these three 
dimensions, based upon amortization methods described in pension plan financial reports as 
entered into the Center for Retirement Research’s Public Plans Database; these financial-report 
methods are likely to correspond quite well to methods used for funding purposes.20 The table 
summarizes data for the 138 out of 160 plans for which there was sufficient data to classify 
amortization methods. 
 
Nearly 40 percent of the plans that could be classified used open methods, with their infinite 
repayment periods, and about 60 percent used closed methods. This table may overstate the 
use of closed methods because some hybrid methods are difficult to classify. For example, for 
2012 the Missouri Local Government Employees Retirement system is classified in the Public 
Plans Database as using closed amortization. However, according to its comprehensive annual 
financial report, “upon attainment of 15 years liabilities are amortized over an open 15-year 
period by level percent of payroll contribution.”21 Its amortization method behaves like an open 
method and the liability is never fully paid down. Additionally, many plans using closed 
amortization reset the amortization period about halfway through, when payments are rising.22 
Because of these classification difficulties, pure closed amortization is not as common as the 
table suggests. 
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Table 1 Prevalence of amortization methods among major public pension plans 
 
 
Level percent amortization methods, which have lower early payments and higher later 
payments than level dollar methods, were more common than the level dollar methods. 
Seventy-one percent of plans, with 72 percent of unfunded liability used level percent methods. 
Those using the longest repayment method, level percent open, accounted for the greatest 
share of unfunded liability (46 percent). 
 
Most plans have long remaining amortization periods. In total, 45 percent of plans had 
remaining amortization periods of 30 years or more, while 36 percent used periods of 20 to 29 
years.23 According to separate calculations not shown in the table, about 60 percent of the 
unfunded liability of public pension funds is being repaid using methods that stretch 
repayments out for 30 years or more. Amortization periods were the longest for the open 
methods, where 75 percent of plans used periods of 30 or more years (in most cases they used 
exactly 30 years). Put differently, the method that generally takes the longest to pay down an 
unfunded liability (open) tended to be combined with the longest amortization periods, 
extending the period to pay down liability. 
 
In the last decade, plans have adopted slightly more aggressive repayment schedules. However, 
most pension funds, and those with the largest unfunded liabilities, still use methods that 
stretch repayments out substantially. Fifteen-year closed level-dollar amortization is about the 
most conservative amortization method used by large plans, and it is very rare. In 2013 only six 
of the 38 plans in the Public Plans Database that used level-dollar amortization used an 
amortization period of 15 years or less. At the other extreme, 30-year open level-percent 
amortization is quite common. In 2013, 28 large plans accounting for 42 percent of the 
unfunded liability of plans with available data used open level-percent with an amortization 
period of 30 or more years.  
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Level percent methods, with their lower initial payments, are attractive to governments that 
sponsor public pension plans. The lower initial payments allow them to keep taxes lower or 
services higher in early years after investment shortfalls. However, low initial payments come at 
the expense of greater contribution payments later and greater tax and service trade-offs later. 
The same is true when investment returns or other actuarial factors work out better than 
expected: level percent methods defer more of the good news than do other methods. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the amortization of an unfunded liability of $100 under five combinations of 
amortization elements, ranging from fast-amortizing 15-year closed level dollar to never-fully-
amortizing 30-year open level percent. The three closed methods pay off the liability eventually 
and thus each crosses the horizontal axis after the 15th or 30th year, respectively. 
 
There is a horizontal line at the one hundred dollar mark. If a line for a particular method goes 
above this level then the liability has actually risen above the original liability, which happens 
for both the closed and open level percent methods. Rising above the original liability, known 
as negative amortization, has been widely criticized. With closed level-percent amortization the 
liability is eventually paid off. However, under open level percent amortization, not only is the 
liability never paid off, it rises forever in nominal dollars under typical assumptions. The 
accounting standard that allowed negative amortization was adopted over the dissent of the 
GASB chair, who argued that this was not an amortization method at all.24  
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Figure 1 Open amortization methods pay down liabilities very slowly, or not at all 
 
 
Although nominal payments and liability can rise forever under 30-year open level-percent 
amortization, liabilities shrink as a share of payroll as the time horizon lengthens, if payroll 
grows faster than liability and other assumptions are met. After 50 years, nominal liability 
under 30-year open level-percent amortization is more than twice its initial value and continues 
to rise, but relative to payroll it is approximately 40 percent of its original level. Contributions as 
a percentage of payroll also decline. Although the burden of amortization contributions falls, it 
continues forever – long after working careers and even retirement years have ended for the 
people for whom that liability was incurred. 
 
Asset smoothing 
The third major element of funding policy is asset smoothing, or when and how to recognize 
investment gains and losses. As with amortization of unfunded liability, asset smoothing 
imposes greater stability on pension contributions in light of investment return volatility. Asset 
smoothing works by recognizing recent investment gains or losses incrementally over several 
years. Actuaries construct the “actuarial value of assets,” which reflects the extent to which 
investment gains and losses have been recognized. One simple form of asset smoothing phases 
in unexpected gains or losses over 5 years: for example, if a pension plan expected to earn $900 
in a given year but only earned $400, it would spread the $500 shortfall over five years, only 
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recognizing $100 in the first year, and $200 in the second year, and so on. Actuarial assets can 
be less than or greater than the market value of assets. 
 
Almost all plans use some form of asset smoothing – between 2001 and 2013, out of 150 plans 
in the Public Plans Database all but a handful (between 5 and 9 in any year), used some form of 
asset smoothing. The vast majority used 5-year averaging of asset values. Seven plans used 10-
year smoothing in 2012. Asset smoothing often is accompanied by caps and collars, which limit 
the divergence between actuarial value of assets and market value of assets. 
 
Asset smoothing has a very different effect than amortization: It forestalls sharp contribution 
increases or decreases in the first few years after investment losses or gains by simply not 
recognizing those gains or losses immediately and fully. By contrast, amortization spreads 
actuarial gains or losses, once recognized, over relatively long time periods. 
 
After an investment shortfall, initial amortization payments under asset smoothing are much 
lower than they otherwise would be because only a portion of the loss is recognized initially, 
but payments ramp up after 5 years. With closed amortization, payments stay higher than they 
otherwise would be until the end of the amortization period, after which contributions fall 
sharply for five years. 
 
Asset smoothing can be attractive to elected officials or others focused on the near term. By 
creating a ramp to a new level of contributions, it provides time for financial and political 
planning. If government tax revenue is cyclical in a way that coincides with investment return 
cycles, asset smoothing could defer contribution increases to periods when government tax 
revenues have recovered from cyclical declines. However, by insulating elected officials with 
short time horizons from the near-term consequences of investment risk – risk that their 
successors may have to bear - asset smoothing creates what economists call a moral hazard, 
where one party takes risks and another bears the costs. 
 
Adjustments to contribution policies 
Governments and pension plans use many variants of the smoothing methods described above. 
One approach that is potentially damaging to pension funding and pension benefit security is 
statutory rules that allow or require governments to pay less than actuarially determined 
contributions; if contributions are below what actuaries request, the plan may never be on a 
path to full funding. This is the primary cause of underfunding in the most deeply underfunded 
plans. According to a recent analysis of 110 large state-administered plans over the 2001-2010 
period, only 50 percent of the observations had fully actuarially determined contributions that 
were not overridden by explicit contributions in statute (e.g., a fixed percentage of payroll), or 
limited or capped in some way, or overridden in appropriations bills.25 26 
 
Results 
An individual simulation entails a sequence of annual pension fund finances for a single fund, 
under a particular funding policy, with a single sequence of annual investment returns chosen 
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randomly. The advantage of examining individual simulations is that they demonstrate the 
volatility that a pension fund might experience over time in a way that is hard to see with 
summary measures. The disadvantage is that we cannot generalize from a single run because 
virtually any sequence of investment returns is possible if they are chosen randomly. To 
illustrate how the model works and the information it produces, we examine three arbitrarily 
chosen individual simulations in the Appendix. 
 
Below we summarize results for different funding policies, each of which we simulated 1,000 
times. In all cases, investment returns have an expected compound annual return of 7.5 
percent (consistent with the typical plan assumption) and a 12 percent standard deviation. 
 
To keep graphs understandable, we focus on just four policies that we selected from 12 
simulated policies. We highlight these policies because three demonstrate the range of current 
practice and the fourth represents a proposed reform. The four policies and their labeling are: 
 
• 15-year closed dollar: Gains and losses are amortized over a 15-year closed 
period, in level-dollar amounts (similar to a fixed-rate home mortgage). This 
approach repays gains and losses completely after 15 years. Ten plans used a 
similar approach in 2013, although they generally combined it with asset 
smoothing. 
• 30-year closed percent: Gains and losses are amortized over a 30-year closed 
period, as a level percentage of payroll, with no asset smoothing. Early payments 
are lower than later payments, with annual payments rising at the rate of payroll 
growth (typically 3 to 4 percent per year). This method repays gains and losses 
completely at the end of 30 years, with the repayment occurring 
disproportionately in later years. Fourteen plans used a similar approach in 2013, 
generally combined with asset smoothing. 
• 30-year open percent asset-5: Gains and losses are amortized over a 30-year 
open period as a level percentage of payroll, with 5-year asset smoothing. As 
discussed earlier, open amortization means that the amortization period is 
constantly reset so that there is always a new 30-year period. The liability 
therefore is never fully repaid, although it is reduced, and can decline 
substantially as a percentage of payroll. Twenty-eight plans accounting for well 
over 40 percent of the unfunded liabilities of large plans use a similar method. 
• SOA Blue Ribbon: As described earlier and as detailed in the appendix, this is the 
contribution benchmark policy that was proposed by a panel commissioned by 
the Society of Actuaries. The panel proposed that pension funds compare their 
actuarially determined contributions with contributions determined under this 
approach. Plan liabilities and contributions would be calculated using a forward-
looking market-based discount rate that is 5.9 percent in our simulations. The 
benchmark uses 15-year level-percent open amortization, with 5-year asset 
smoothing. 
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We also show the deterministic scenario (7.5 percent investment return each and every year) 
for the 30-year open level-percent funding policy with 5-year asset smoothing, labeled as 
Deterministic-30-open-5. 
 
Employer contributions 
We begin with the median employer contribution rate across 1,000 simulations under each of 
the four policies (Figure 2). We show results for 40 years so that the declines in contributions 
after closed amortization periods end are apparent: 
• The initial contribution under the Society of Actuaries (SOA) benchmark is as much as 
twice that of the other policies, primarily because the market-based discount rate is 5.9 
percent, compared with the 7.5 percent assumed for all of the other funding policies. In 
the simulations the plan earns 7.5 percent on average despite the lower discount rate, 
and so the contribution falls steadily.27 It is not surprising that the SOA Benchmark has a 
salutary impact on funded ratios, and that governments might prefer other methods 
that have much lower initial contributions. 
• Employer contributions fall sharply in the 15-year and 30-year closed amortization 
policies, after their respective amortization periods end, because the initial 25 percent 
underfunding is treated as a shock that occurred in a single event and it is fully 
amortized at the end of the period. 
• The 30-year open policy has the lowest contributions between years 2 and 15, and the 
highest contributions after year 30.  
 
Figure 2 Initial employer contribution rates are highest under the SOA Benchmark, and second-highest under 15-year 
level dollar closed amortization 
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While medians show what happens in the typical case, they don’t reveal the implications of 
investment return volatility. For that, we need the probabilistic measures described earlier. 
Figure 3 shows the probability that employer contributions will rise above 30 percent of payroll 
during the first 30 years. The deterministic scenario, which has an employer contribution 
ranging from about 14 percent of payroll to 12 percent depending on the year (see Figure 2 
above), has zero chance of the employer contribution rising above 30 percent. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the highly smoothed policy of 30-year open funding as a level percentage of 
payroll, with 5-year asset smoothing, has near-zero probability of employer contributions rising 
above 30 percent. At the other extreme, the SOA benchmark would start out with contributions 
above 30 percent and so the probability is 100 percent. The two closed-period policies fall 
between these extremes. 
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Figure 3 30-year open level-percent funding has virtually no chance of an employer contribution above 30% of payroll 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the probability that employer contributions will rise by more than 10 percent of 
payroll in any 5-year period within the first 30 years. There is no chance of this when 
investment returns are deterministic – 7.5 percent each and every year. However, it is possible 
when investment returns vary, in which case investment shortfalls may trigger contribution 
increases. The quicker and more forcefully that a funding policy responds to investment 
shortfalls, the greater the probability that contributions will rise by more than 10 percent. Thus, 
this probability is greatest for the 15-year closed period level-dollar funding policy: it repays 
shortfalls over a fixed relatively short period, with constant-dollar payments that are higher 
than under level-percent funding policies. 
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Figure 4 Closed funding methods have a greater chance of contribution increases of more than 10% of payroll 
 
 
It is easy to see why the very stretched-out policy of 30-year open-period funding as a level 
percentage of payroll is attractive to employers. Unlike other policies currently used by funds, it 
has near-zero chance of employer contributions rising above 30 percent, and a very low 
probability that contributions will rise by more than 10 percentage points in a 5-year period. It 
provides stability to plan sponsors. That stability comes at a price, however: a risk of severe 
underfunding when investment returns vary from year to year. 
 
Impact on plan funding 
Figure 5 shows the median funded ratio across 1,000 simulations for each of the funding 
policies. Under the deterministic scenario and its stochastic counterpart (30-year open period 
level-percent funding with 5-year asset smoothing), the funded ratio rises from the initial 75 
percent to about 87 percent after 30 years: the plan never quite achieves full funding but 
moves in that direction. The two closed-period methods eventually raise the funded ratio 
above 100 percent, in part because contributions are not allowed to become negative (the 
sponsor cannot withdraw money from the plan if it becomes overfunded, so there is always 
upward pressure on funding). The SOA benchmark as we have modeled it overfunds the plan 
substantially – it discounts liabilities at 5.9 percent but then achieves compound investment 
returns of 7.5 percent. 
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Figure 5 Median funded ratio can remain below 100% or rise substantially above, depending on funding policy 
 
As with employer contributions, medians do not provide information on the risk of 
underfunding. Figure 6 shows the probability that the funded ratio will fall below 40 percent 
during the first 30 years. Here the results are the opposite of the results for employer 
contributions: the funding policies that repay shortfalls most aggressively and quickly have the 
least chance of a funded ratio falling below 40 percent. However, the relatively common 
funding policy of 30-year open period level-percent funding with 5-year asset smoothing has a 
far greater risk of severe underfunding, reaching 17 percent by the end of 30 years – a one in 
six chance of severe underfunding. 
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Figure 6 30-year open level-percent funding runs far greater risks of severe underfunding than the other funding 
policies 
 
Figure 6 demonstrates a very important conclusion: When the assumed investment return is 
achieved each and every year and actuarial contributions are paid, as in the deterministic 
scenario, there is zero risk of severe underfunding. But if investment returns vary from year to 
year, there can be a substantial risk of severe underfunding (a one in six chance in this case), 
even if expected returns are correct on average and even if governments pay full actuarial 
contributions. 
 
Finally, Figure 7 shows the risk of a 75-percent funded plan falling below three different 
funded-ratio thresholds when the common funding policy is used: 60 percent, 50 percent, and 
40 percent. The red line shows the likelihood of falling below 60 percent: there is a more than 
50 percent chance of falling below this level within 20 years. 
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Figure 7 A typical plan that starts out 75% funded and uses a common funding policy has more than a 50% chance of 
falling below 60 percent funding within 20 years 
 
 
The three elements of the amortization method affect the degree to which costs are pushed to 
the future. The amortization period and the level-percent versus level-dollar choice affect each 
other. Extending the amortization period from 15 years to 30 years has a bigger negative 
impact on funded status when combined with the level percent method than when combined 
with the level dollar method. And switching to level percent from level dollar has a bigger 
negative impact on funded status when combined with 30-year amortization than with a 15-
year period. Replacing open amortization with closed amortization can considerably improve 
the long-run funded status at the expense of higher contributions. 
 
None of the smoothing policies can prevent sharp rises or falls in contributions over the long 
run. If funds are invested in risky assets, smoothing policies can alter the time it takes to reach 
higher contributions but does not change the long-run path markedly. 
 
Finally, Figure 8, which shows quartiles for the funded ratio of the pension plan over time under 
the typical smoothing policy, illustrates a conclusion that may be surprising to some people. 
The risk of better than expected or worse than expected funding outcomes increases over time. 
That is, the gap between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile grows over time. This 
results primarily because investment returns are independent from year to year. When that is 
true, which is often assumed in financial simulations, it is well known that the volatility of asset 
values rises over time. While the variability in compound annual returns diminishes over time, 
this is more than offset by compounding those returns over more years. If returns are not 
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independent – if, for example, bad investment years are followed by good years, and vice versa 
- the gap in Figure 8 might not widen so significantly, or conceivably it could even narrow. 
Under some investment return assumptions, the gap could widen even more. 
 
Figure 8 Funding risk rises over time 
 
 
Figure 8 also shows that the risk is skewed in the sense that the best outcomes - high funded 
ratios - rise by more than the worst outcomes fall. The lower bound of the funded ratio is zero, 
but there is no limit to how high the funded ratio can rise. In addition, because the model does 
not allow negative contributions when the plan becomes overfunded, there is a built-in 
tendency for further overfunding. This is consistent with the practice of plan funding – sponsors 
generally are not allowed to withdraw funds if a plan becomes overfunded. 
 
What happens if contributions are less than actuarially determined contributions? 
Our analysis up to this point assumes that plan sponsors always make full required 
contributions. In practice this often is not true, especially when the required contribution is so 
high that it is difficult for the sponsor to afford. Andrew Biggs of the American Enterprise 
Institute found that the higher the actuarially required contribution (ARC) is as a percentage of 
payroll, the less likely the sponsor is to pay the full ARC and the lower the percentage of ARC is 
paid.28 
 
We model the consequences of a shortfall in paying the actuarially determined contribution by 
imposing a cap on the employer contribution as percentage of payroll, an approach similar to 
that used by Biggs, in essence assuming that employer underpayment occurs at this point. We 
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model a cap on the employer contribution rate that is approximately three times the “steady 
state” employer contribution rate of a fully funded plan that achieves a constant investment 
return equal to its assumed return. For a plan with the common funding policy of 30-year level-
percent open amortization with 5-year asset smoothing and a 7.5 percent discount rate, the 
“steady state” employer contribution rate is around 6.7 percent, and so we model an employer 
contribution cap of 20 percent of payroll (about three times 6.7 percent). 
 
Figure 9 shows the impact of this underpayment behavior on the plan’s funded status. The two 
lines on the upper part of the figure give the median funded ratio of the plan with and without 
the contribution cap. The cap has little impact on the median funded ratio until year 20, and in 
year 40 the funded ratio of the plan with contribution cap is about 3 percent lower than the 
one without the cap. The impact is relatively small because the median contribution rate is 
lower than 15 percent (see Figure 2), which is well below the 20 percent contribution cap. 
However, the effect of the contribution cap is more prominent when the plan faces bad return 
scenarios and the contribution cap is therefore triggered more frequently, which is represented 
by the 25th percentile lines of funded ratio on the lower part of the graph (25 percent of 1,000 
simulations have funded ratios lower than those presented by the 25th percentile lines). In year 
40, the 25th percentile funded ratio of the capped plan is almost 10 percentage points lower 
than the uncapped plan. In this simulation result, the contribution cap is not triggered a lot in 
early years because of the low initial employer contribution rate. If the initial contribution rate 
is higher, the cap would be triggered more frequently, leading to a larger negative impact on 
the plan’s long-term funded status. 
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Figure 9 Contribution underpayment (modeled as a cap on employer contributions) has a larger impact on funded 
status under bad return scenarios (e.g., at the 25th percentile) than under better scenarios (e.g., at the median) 
 
 
The trade-off between contribution volatility and the risk of underfunding 
As much of the previous discussion suggests, there is a trade-off between contribution volatility 
and the risk of underfunding. Governments understandably want stable contributions – 
inherently difficult to achieve when investment returns are volatile. In general, the more that 
plans and governments rely on amortization and other smoothing techniques to reduce 
contribution volatility, the greater the risk that funding ratios will fall to low levels – perhaps to 
levels that are not politically sustainable and that lead to significant benefit cuts or risk of 
nonpayment. 
 
Figure 10 illustrates this tradeoff. The vertical axis shows the probability that the funded ratio 
will fall below 40 percent at any point during the first 30 years. The horizontal axis shows a 
measure of contribution volatility – the probability that employer contributions will rise by 
more than 10 percent of payroll during any five years in the first 30. The graph makes clear that 
plans that use funding policies with low contribution volatility, such as 30-year level-percent 
open with 5-year asset smoothing, have much greater likelihood of encountering a very low 
funded ratio. 
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Figure 10 Contribution smoothing policies reduce contribution volatility but increase the risk of severe underfunding 
 
 
 
Finally, Table 2 shows the probability of severe underfunding and the contribution volatility 
measures for a larger group of funding policies, including all of the policies in Figure 10. 
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Table 2 Funded ratio risk and contribution volatility for selected funding policies 
 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
The most-common funding policies and practices reduce contribution volatility at the same 
time that they increase the likelihood of severe underfunding. These policies are unlikely to 
bring underfunded plans to full funding within 30 years, even if investment-return assumptions 
are met every single year and employers make full actuarially determined contributions. For 
example, a 75 percent funded plan using a common policy of 30-year open amortization as a 
constant percentage of payroll, with 5-year asset smoothing, would only reach 85 percent 
funding after 30 years even if it earned 7.5 percent every year. When investment returns are 
variable, plans and their sponsors face substantial risk of potential crises: the same plan would 
face a one in six chance of falling below 40 percent funding within 30 years if its investment 
return assumption is correct on average but has a 12 percent standard deviation. If sponsors do 
not pay full actuarial contributions or if reasonable expected returns are less than 7.5 percent, 
the risk of severe underfunding would be greater. 
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This raises important questions about the impact that pension contributions will have on state 
and local government taxes and spending, and questions about the security of pension benefits. 
When returns are good and contributions are driven downward, will governments resist the 
urge to increase benefits, or will they raise them as some have done in the past? Will they resist 
the urge to embark on other spending programs that may have to be cut in later years if returns 
are bad? When returns are bad and requested contributions are driven up sharply, will elected 
officials be willing to raise taxes and cut spending to support those contributions, or will many 
pay less than actuarially determined amounts as often has occurred previously? 
 
In the current low-interest-rate and low-inflation environment plans are taking the risk of 
substantial investment income shortfalls to have reasonable chances of achieving their 
investment return assumptions. This means that investment earnings will be particularly 
volatile and funding policy takes on greater importance. In the face of earnings volatility, plans 
can attempt to dampen contribution volatility through the smoothing methods available to 
them, but only at the expense of making funded ratios more volatile, increasing the risk that 
pension funds will become severely underfunded and that required contribution increases will 
be politically untenable. 
 
Investment risk-taking and the changing environment 
Public pension plan investment risks have increased over time 
Public pension plans in the U.S. now invest nearly two-thirds of their assets in equity-like 
investments, up from one-quarter in the 1970s and about 40 percent in 1990. While public 
plans once were more conservative investors than private defined benefit plans, they now have 
a much greater share of their assets invested in equity-like investments than do private plans. 
(Figure 11.29)  
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Figure 11. Public pension funds have increased their investments in equity-like assets 
 
 
One likely reason for the increasing allocation of assets by public pension plans to equities is 
that nominal risk-free returns have declined substantially, but public pension funds’ earnings 
assumptions have been “sticky,” barely falling at all. (Figure 12.30) In contrast, private sector 
plans have been reducing earnings assumptions along with the declining risk-free returns. 
Several economists have argued that assumed returns have not followed risk-free returns 
downward in part because pension fund boards and sponsors prefer high discount rates, which 
keep the reported actuarial value of pension liabilities and actuarially determined contributions 
lower, all else equal. Their research suggests that the move toward riskier assets reflects the 
unique nature of the regulatory and standards-setting environment for public pension funds, 
particularly the accounting standards and actuarial practices that value liabilities with discount 
rates equal to earnings assumptions generally selected by the plans themselves. These 
standards and practices for public plans in the United States are different than the standards, 
practices, and rules for private plans and for public plans in other countries.31 
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Figure 12. Public pension fund earnings assumptions barely fell, despite substantial declines in risk-free rates 
 
 
The decline in risk-free rates created difficult choices for public pension funds. In 1990, after a 
multi-year drop from unprecedented inflation-induced heights, 10-year Treasuries were still 
above eight percent and public pension plans were assuming they would earn just under eight 
percent; pension funds could achieve their assumptions while taking very little risk. At the time 
plan funds were only about 40 percent invested in equity-like assets. From 1990 through the 
present, risk-free rates fell significantly and 10-year Treasuries are now yielding under two 
percent. Public pension plans could have chosen to reduce their earnings assumptions as risk-
free rates fell. Reducing assumptions would have led to large increases in actuarially 
determined contributions, causing potential stress for employers. For the most part, public 
pension funds did not do this, presumably believing that they could achieve their long-term 
earnings assumptions while taking reasonable risks, and perhaps believing that the fall in risk-
free rates was temporary. Between 1990 and 2014, risk-free rates fell by about six percentage 
points and the share of assets in equity-like investments rose by about 25 percentage points. In 
any event, in the current environment commonly used discount rates of seven percent to eight 
percent can only be justified by investing in asset classes that might be expected to earn 
substantially more, on average, than risk-free assets, but that are likely to have volatile returns. 
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Analysis and results for different investment return scenarios 
In the analysis that follows, we use the Rockefeller Institute’s pension simulation model to 
examine three sets of investment-return scenarios: 
• The “pure” impact of volatility: To isolate the role of investment return volatility, we 
examine scenarios in which the only thing that changes from scenario to scenario is the 
volatility of investment returns, while the expected investment return is held constant. 
(In the real world, higher risk is often accompanied by higher expected returns. We 
address that trade-off in other scenarios.) 
• Policy response to a decline over time in risk-free returns: Here we consider the trade-
off that pension funds faced over time as risk-free returns fell, when they faced a choice 
between investing in riskier assets to maintain an assumed rate of return, or 
maintaining the same level of portfolio risk by lowering assumed returns and raising 
contribution requirements. (In practice, they could have chosen between these 
extremes.) While it is clear in retrospect that plans faced this choice, at the time, as risk-
free rates were falling, it may not have been clear that the investing environment was 
changing fundamentally. 
• The true expected rate of return is less than the assumed return: Our examination of 
publicly available recent capital market assumptions suggests that the assumed 
investment returns of public pension plans, which are mostly in the range of seven 
percent to eight percent, are difficult to achieve with their current portfolios even 
though the share of risky assets has been increased greatly.32 In this scenario we 
examine the implications for plan funded status and required employer contributions if 
the true expected compound return is lower than the assumed return by 1.5 percentage 
points, in a manner consistent with publicly available capital market assumptions. 
 
In the following sections we describe each set of scenarios in more detail and then present 
results of our analysis. 
 
The pure impact of volatility 
To analyze the pure impact of volatility, we examine three scenarios, each of which has an 
expected compound return of 7.5 percent, but with different degrees of volatility: an 8 percent 
standard deviation (least volatile), a 12 percent standard deviation (consistent with 
assumptions that several plans have used), and a 16 percent standard deviation (most 
volatile).33 
 
Figure 13 shows the median funded ratio and the 25th percentile and 75th percentile under 
each scenario. Within a given scenario (any single panel) the range of funded ratios increases 
over time (the gap between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile increases). As we move 
from left to right across the scenarios, the standard deviation increases and with it the range of 
likely funded ratios increases (the 75th-25th percentile gap is greater in the right panel than in 
the panels to the left). In other words, as investment risk increases funded ratios are likely to 
become more volatile. 
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Figure 13. The range of likely funded ratios widens as the volatility of investment returns increases 
 
 
Figure 14 shows the probability that the pension plan will become severely underfunded under 
each of the scenarios. The impact of volatility is quite clear: The probability that the plan will 
become less than 40 percent funded sometime in the first 30 years is about 32 percent when 
the standard deviation is 16 percent, eight times as large as the probability when the standard 
deviation is only eight percent.  
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Figure 14. The probability of severe underfunding is much greater when volatility is high than when it is low, if the 
expected return is held constant 
 
 
Figure 15 shows the median employer contribution rate and the 25th percentile and 75th 
percentile under each scenario. Within a given scenario (any single panel) the range of 
employer contribution rates increases over time (the gap between the 75th percentile and the 
25th percentile increases). As we move from left to right across the scenarios, the standard 
deviation increases and with it the range of likely employer contribution rates increases (the 
75th-25th percentile gap is greater in the right panel than in the panels to the left). In other 
words, as investment risk increases employer contributions are likely to become more volatile. 
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Figure 15. The range of likely employer contribution rates widens as the volatility of investment returns increases 
 
 
 
As the range of likely employer contribution rates widens, the chance that employer 
contribution rates will become extremely high also increases. We do not provide a separate 
figure showing the probability that the employer contribution will rise above 30 percent of 
payroll. But the probability is essentially zero by year 30 under the scenario with 8 percent 
standard deviation, while the probability rises to about 2.5 percent when the standard 
deviation is 12 percent, and to about 8 percent when the standard deviation is 16 percent.  
 
Figure 16 shows the probability that the employer will face a contribution increase of 10 
percent or more of payroll within a five-year period under each of the scenarios. Again, the 
impact of investment-return volatility is clear: The probability of a significant employer 
contribution increase sometime in the first 30 years is about 36 percent when the standard 
deviation is 16 percent, more than 10 times as large as the probability when the standard 
deviation is only eight percent.  
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Figure 16. The probability of a substantial increase in employer contributions is much greater when volatility is high 
than when it is low, if expected return is held constant 
  
 
As the figures above show, the impact of a “pure” change in volatility on funded ratio and 
employer contribution risks is substantial. These are not real-world trade-offs because they 
assume the expected compound return remains a constant 7.5 percent in all three scenarios: in 
the real world, plans generally can only reduce volatility by accepting a lower expected return. 
Still, the scenarios illustrate the important impacts that investment-return volatility has on plan 
and employer finances. 
 
Scenarios for plan responses to a decline over time in risk-free returns 
Three scenarios 
Next we examine trade-offs that arise when investment-return volatility and expected returns 
both change, similar in concept to what happened over the last two decades. In this analysis, a 
substantial decline in risk-free returns presents the plan with the choice between investing in 
riskier assets to maintain the expected rate of return, or maintaining its asset allocation and 
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overall risk profile, forcing it to accept a lower expected return and also raise requested 
employer contributions to make up for lower expected investment income. 
 
We constructed three scenarios: the “good old days,” with a high risk-free rate of 6.7 percent, 
and two scenarios in which the risk-free rate has fallen by four percentage points to 2.7 
percent. (This is about as much as 10-year Treasuries fell between 2000 and the present, and 
about as much as 30-year Treasuries fell between the mid-1990s and the present.) We 
constructed these scenarios so that the relationship between the risk premium and volatility is 
the same across the scenarios:34 
 
• The “good old days”: The risk-free rate of return is 6.7 percent and the plan takes on 
only a little bit of risk: it has an expected compound return of 7.5 percent with a 
standard deviation of 1.8 percent. It discounts liabilities at 7.5 percent, consistent with 
its expected earnings. 
• Invest in riskier assets, justifying high assumed return: Faced with a risk-free rate that 
has fallen to 2.7 percent, the plan shifts into riskier assets allowing it to maintain the 
same 7.5 percent expected compound return, but with more volatility – the standard 
deviation increases from 1.8 percent to 12 percent. The plan continues to discount 
liabilities at 7.5 percent, consistent with its assumed earnings. This scenario is similar to 
how many plans behaved as risk-free rates fell. 
• Lower assumed return and maintain asset allocation: In this alternative, the plan also is 
faced with a risk-free rate that has fallen to 2.7 percent, but instead of shifting into 
riskier assets, it maintains its asset allocation and lowers its assumed compound return 
to 3.5 percent, so that its standard deviation is 1.8 percent – the same as in the “good 
old days.” The plan discounts liabilities at 3.5 percent, consistent with the expected 
return of its portfolio, and therefore must request substantially higher contributions 
from employers. This scenario is a sort of counter-reality: what plans might have done if 
they had been willing to raise employer contributions dramatically. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the key characteristics of the three scenarios.35 
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Table 3. Scenarios for policy response to a decline in the risk-free rate over time 
 
 
Results – funded ratios 
The choice to invest in riskier assets entails much more risk to the funded ratio than either the 
"good old days" scenario or the "lower discount rate" scenarios. Figure 17 shows the median 
funded ratios and the 25th percentiles and 75th percentiles, calculated over 1,000 simulations 
of each of the three scenarios (3,000 simulations in all).36 The range of likely funded ratios is 
much greater under the “invest in riskier assets” scenario than under either the “good old days” 
scenario or the “lower assumed return” scenario. The median funded ratio rises much more 
rapidly in the “lower assumed return” scenario (rightmost panel). This occurs because the 
pension fund lowered its earnings assumption and requested much higher contributions from 
employers, as we will see in the next section. This allowed plan funding to rise quite rapidly 
relative to the other scenarios. 
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Figure 17. The choice to invest in riskier assets entails much more risk to the funded ratio than either the "good old 
days" scenario or the "lower discount rate" scenario 
 
 
Figure 18 shows the probability of severe underfunding for each scenario. Under the “good old 
days” and the “lower assumed return” scenarios, there is essentially zero chance of severe 
underfunding. In both scenarios the standard deviation is only 1.8 percent, so there is very little 
investment return volatility – the plan almost always comes very close to achieving its assumed 
return and there is little risk. By contrast, in the “invest in riskier assets” scenario (green line), 
there is about a one in six (17 percent) chance that the plan will be severely underfunded 
within 30 years. By taking on risk, the plan kept employer contributions low, at the expense of 
funding risk. 
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Figure 18. Probability of severe underfunding is much greater in the "Invest in riskier assets" scenario 
 
 
Results – contributions 
Figure 19 shows the median employer contribution rates and the 25th percentiles and 75th 
percentiles under each scenario. Under the “invest in riskier assets” scenario the contributions 
are much lower than if the plan were to lower the discount rate and increase requested 
contributions, but they are subject to much greater volatility due to the more-volatile 
investment portfolio. The median employer contribution under the “lower assumed return” 
scenario is about triple what the contribution was before risk-free rates dropped (“good old 
days”) and about triple the contribution that was required when the plan invested in riskier 
assets. This dramatic increase in contributions that would be required by lowered investment 
return assumptions may help to explain why plans moved into riskier assets. 
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Figure 19. The employer contribution rate is much lower under the "Invest in riskier assets" scenario, but is much more 
variable 
 
 
 
For these scenarios we do not present our measure of the probability that employer 
contributions will rise above 30 percent of payroll because in this case it does not provide 
meaningful information.37  
 
Figure 20 shows the probability that employer contributions will rise by more than 10 percent 
of payroll in any five-year period under the three scenarios. The “invest in riskier assets” 
scenario, with its much greater chance of large investment-return shortfalls, carries a much 
greater risk that contributions will have to rise substantially in a relatively short period of time 
than do either of the other scenarios. However, that increase generally will be from a lower 
level of contributions than would be required under the “lower assumed return” scenario. 
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Figure 20. The probability of employer contributions rising by more than 10 percent of payroll in a five-year period is 
greatest in the "Invest in riskier assets" scenario 
 
 
Summary of impacts of responses to a sustained decline in risk-free interest rates 
Our analysis shows that plans faced a fundamental trade-off in response to a sustained decline 
in risk-free interest rates, as summarized in Table 4: If they invested in riskier assets, the risk to 
the pension fund would increase significantly but government contributions would remain low. 
The riskier-assets scenario resulted in a 16.9 percent probability for our prototypical plan that 
plan funding would fall below 40 percent sometime during the 30 years – a level that has been 
associated with crises in several states. If instead the plan lowered assumed investment 
returns, the risk to the pension fund would remain minimal, but employer contributions would 
have to triple, and would stay high for all 30 years of the simulation period.38 This dramatic 
increase in required contributions may go a long way toward explaining why plans have taken 
on increased investment risk. 
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Table 4. Plans faced a trade-off when risk-free rates fell: Increase risk to the pension fund, or lower return assumptions 
and increase government contributions 
 
 
Scenario in which the true expected rate of return is less than the assumed return 
While public pension funds generally have increased investments in risky assets and maintained 
assumed rates of return as risk-free rates declined, some current market forecasts suggest that 
it remains very difficult for public pension funds to achieve their assumed returns in the current 
market environment. To examine the consequences of using earnings assumptions that may be 
higher than true expected returns (which are unknowable), we constructed a scenario based on 
our analysis of publicly available capital market assumptions. In this scenario, the standard 
deviation of returns is 12 percent, the same as in the “invest in riskier assets” scenario, but the 
expected long-term compound return consistent with this volatility level is only 6 percent, 1.5 
percentage points below the assumed investment return.  
Figure 21 compares the median funded ratios, and the 25th percentiles and 75th percentiles 
under a base-case scenario where the true expected compound return equals the 7.5 percent 
earnings assumption (left panel), and our lower-return scenario in which true expected 
compound return is only 6 percent but the pension plan assumes it is 7.5 percent (right panel). 
In this scenario (the right panel) investment returns tend to fall short on average, and the 
median funded ratio declines over time, falling to about 60 percent by year 30. By contrast, 
when the earnings assumption is met (left panel), the median funded ratio rises gradually and 
reaches almost 90 percent after 30 years. 
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Figure 21. The median funded ratio declines over time when true expected compound return is lower than the earnings 
assumption 
 
Figure 22 shows that when the earnings assumption is higher than the true return, it greatly 
increases the risk of the funded ratio falling into crisis territory. The blue line and red line show 
the probability of the funded ratio falling below 40 percent under the two scenarios. When the 
true expected compound return falls short of the assumption by 1.5 percent, there is a more 
than a one in three chance that the funded ratio will fall into what we consider crisis territory at 
some point in the 30-year period. This risk is more than twice as high as it is if the earnings 
assumption equals the true expected return. 
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Figure 22. The probability of extremely low funding more than doubles when the true expected compound return falls 
short of the earnings assumption 
 
 
When the true expected compound return is lower than the earnings assumption, actual 
investment returns are likely to fall short of the assumed return in any given year. When that 
occurs employer contributions will have to rise to make up the shortfall. Figure 23 shows the 
median, 25th percentile and 75th percentile employer contribution as a percentage of payroll 
when the true expected compound return and assumed return are both 7.5 percent (left panel) 
and when the true expected return is 6 percent but is assumed to be 7.5 percent (right panel). 
The median employer contribution in the first year is about 14 percent in both scenarios. In the 
overly optimistic assumption scenario (right panel) it rises continually, reaching about 19 
percent by year 30 - approximately 9 percentage points higher than when the 7.5 percent 
earnings assumption is met.  
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Figure 23. The median employer contribution rises over time when the true expected compound return falls short of 
the earnings assumption 
 
We do not present a separate figure showing the probability that the employer contribution 
will rise above 30 percent of payroll at some point during 30 years. However, this probability is 
about 7.5 percent when the assumed return is too optimistic, compared to only 2.5 percent 
when the expected compound return and assumed return are both 7.5 percent. 
 
Finally, although the two scenarios have the same investment-return volatility, the overly 
optimistic scenario has a greater risk that employer contributions will rise by more than 10 
percent of payroll in a 5-year period, as Figure 24 shows. 
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Figure 24. Sharp employer contribution increases are likely if assumed returns are higher than “true” expected returns
 
Conclusions about investment risk-taking 
The decline in risk-free interest rates since the 1980s and 1990s has created a very difficult 
investing environment for public pension plans. Before the decline, the typical plan could have 
achieved its investment-return assumptions while taking very little risk. As rates declined, 
public plans faced a choice: either reduce investment-return assumptions and request much 
higher contributions from governments, or maintain assumptions, avoid increasing 
contributions from governments, and take on much greater risk.  
 
For the most part, public pension funds have maintained their investment-return assumptions, 
perhaps in the belief that interest rate declines were temporary and that in the longer run high 
investment returns could again be obtained at low levels of risk. But maintaining their 
assumptions implicitly required them to invest in riskier assets. 
 
We modeled the implications of a sustained reduction in risk-free interest rates by examining a 
prototypical pension plan under three scenarios: 
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■ The good old days: The pension plan can expect to earn a 7.5 percent return with very 
little investment-return volatility, or risk. This is similar to what plans might have been 
able to achieve two or three decades ago. As the name implies, pension plans no longer 
have this beneficial choice available. 
■ Invest in riskier assets: In response to declining risk-free rates, the pension plan 
maintains a 7.5 percent earnings assumption but invests in riskier assets. Even though it 
can expect a long-run compound return of 7.5 percent, some years will be much higher 
and some will be much lower. Our measure of investment-return volatility, the standard 
deviation, is 12 percent in this scenario. This is similar to what many public pension 
plans did as risk-free rates fell. 
■ Lower assumed return: In this scenario, instead of investing in risker assets in response 
to declining risk-free rates, the pension plan lowers its earnings assumption to 3.5 
percent and remains invested in relatively low-risk assets, with a standard deviation of 
1.8 percent. This forces the plan to raise contributions from governments. For the most 
part, public pension plans have not done this (although they have raised contributions in 
response to investment shortfalls). Lowering risk and raising contributions remains an 
option. 
 
Pension plans were not limited to one response or the other – they could have chosen to be in-
between. 
 
We modeled the finances of our prototypical pension fund over 30 years, assuming that 
employers pay full actuarially determined contributions. Our analysis shows that plans faced a 
fundamental trade-off: If they invested in riskier assets, the risk to the pension fund would 
increase significantly but government contributions would remain low. The riskier-assets 
scenario resulted in a 16.9 percent probability for our prototypical plan that plan funding would 
fall below 40 percent sometime during the 30 years – a level that has been associated with 
crises in several states. If instead the plan lowered assumed investment returns, the risk to the 
pension fund would remain minimal, but employer contributions would have to triple, and 
would stay high for all 30 years of the simulation period. This dramatic increase in required 
contributions may go a long way toward explaining why plans have taken on increased 
investment risk. 
 
We also examined what would happen if plan earnings assumptions, which are in the range of 7 
to 8 percent for most plans, are too optimistic, as some professional market forecasts suggest. 
We simulated a scenario in which the true expected compound return is 1.5 percentage points 
lower than the assumed return of 7.5 percent. In that scenario the plan has a more than a one 
in three chance of experiencing severe underfunding at some point over the next 30 years, 
which is more than twice as high as when the investment earnings assumption is met. Employer 
contributions as a percentage of payroll would be expected to rise substantially over time, 
whereas if the return assumption is met they would fall over time; by the end of 30 years, the 
median employer contributions in this scenario are almost 50 percent higher than when 
investment return assumptions are met. 
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Conclusions 
Stochastic simulation is an important tool for understanding the potential consequences of 
investment return risk and volatility for public pension plans, for the governments that 
contribute to these plans, and for stakeholders in these governments who ultimately bear the 
risks. We have used a stochastic simulation model to examine the interplay between 
investment return risk and funding policies, and to examine the potential implications of the 
changing investment environment. 
 
Our analysis of funding policy shows that there are important trade-offs between risks to the 
finances of public pension plans, and risks to their sponsoring governments. The most-common 
funding policies and practices reduce contribution volatility at the same time that they increase 
the likelihood of severe underfunding. These policies are unlikely to bring underfunded plans to 
full funding within 30 years, even if investment-return assumptions are met every single year 
and employers make full actuarially determined contributions. 
 
Our analysis of the changing investment return environment shows that the choice by most 
public pension plans to increase investment portfolio risk in the face of falling risk-free returns, 
helping them to maintain investment return assumptions, has keep governmental contributions 
much lower than they otherwise would have been, but also has created greater risk to pension 
plan funding. 
 
Many funds now are in a very difficult position. Reducing investment risk would help to shore 
up plan finances, but at the expense of much higher contributions from governments. Many 
plans have made small reductions in investment-return risk in recent years, but it remains much 
higher than in earlier periods. 
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Appendix 
Illustrative simulations 
We examine three arbitrarily chosen individual simulations to illustrate how the model works 
and the information is produces. In these illustrative simulations we examine a single funding 
policy: 30-year level-percent open with 5-year asset smoothing, a common approach as 
discussed earlier. The three individual simulations are: 
• A “deterministic” run in which the pension fund earns exactly 7.5 percent on its 
investments every year 
• A run with generally high investment returns in the early years and lower investment 
returns in later years (sim #56). This run results in a compound annual return of 7.5 
percent over the first 30 years. 
• A run with generally low investment returns in the early years and higher investment 
returns in later years, also resulting in a compound annual return of 7.5 percent over the 
first 30 years (sim #228). 
 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the annual return and cumulative compound return 
for each of the two simulations. As is apparent, even though these two individual simulations 
achieve the assumed 7.5 percent compound return by the end of 30 years, annual returns are 
extremely volatile even when investment return assumptions are attained. Furthermore, these 
two selected simulations understate the volatility that plans face: most of the 1,000 simulations 
do NOT result in a compound average return of 7.5 percent over 30 years – the 30-year average 
falls below 6 percent about one quarter of the time, above 9 percent about one quarter of the 
time, and between 6 percent and 9 percent half of the time. Thus, contributions and funded 
ratios will be more variable most of the time than in the illustrative simulations we examine 
below. We summarize the full range of variability later. 
  
 
The SOA Blue Ribbon Panel’s Standardized Contribution Benchmark 
In 2014 a panel commissioned by the Society of Actuaries proposed that public pension plans 
disclose (but not necessarily fund) a standardized contribution, to help users assess the 
adequacy and reasonableness of the plan’s actual or recommended contributions.39 The 
Standardized Contribution Benchmark (SCB) would have the following key features: 
 
• The discount rate would continue to be based upon an earnings assumption as is 
current actuarial practice. However, it would be “forward looking” and based upon 
current market conditions, rather than being based primarily on historical returns. The 
example contribution provided by the Blue Ribbon Panel in its 2014 report estimated a 
discount rate of 6.4 percent. In current market conditions, the equivalent rate would be 
about a half percent lower. 
• Unfunded liabilities would be amortized using a 15-year open level-percent method. 
• Five-year asset smoothing would be used. 
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Inflation and salary assumptions would be adjusted to be consistent with the discount rate 
assumptions. 
 
These features generally would result in a higher benchmark contribution than contributions 
resulting from other methods for two reasons. First, the discount rate generally would be lower 
in the current market environment, resulting in (a) higher normal costs, and (b) higher actuarial 
liabilities and therefore higher unfunded liabilities to amortize. (These movements could be 
offset partially by lower inflation and salary assumptions.) Second, the 15-year amortization 
period is shorter than periods in common use (as Table 1 shows, 79 percent of plans use 
periods of 20 years or more) and thus would result in a higher contribution. 
 
Figure 25 Simulated returns are extremely volatile from year to year, even if assumed return is achieved at 30 years 
 
Error! Reference source not found. shows employer contribution rates for the three 
simulations. The rates are quite stable for the run in which returns are precisely 7.5 percent 
every year – the typical actuarial assumption – but they are highly variable for the other two 
simulation runs. Simulation #228 with low early returns and high later returns results in 
substantial but varying contribution rates, increasing by about 8 percentage points of payroll in 
the first 15 years (a 57 percent increase), then falling almost continuously as higher investment 
returns are achieved. Simulation #56, with high early returns and low later returns, generates 
lower contributions than the deterministic simulation throughout the first 30 years, but 
contributions fluctuate considerably, rising or falling by as much as 6 percentage points of 
payroll in periods of three to four years. 
 
Thus, even if a plan achieves its assumed returns over a 30-year period, contributions – and 
legislators who must adjust government budgets to accommodate contributions – will be on a 
bumpy ride. 
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Figure 26 Employer contribution rates vary dramatically even for simulations that have the same compound average 
return 
 
 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the variability in funded status. After 30 years the 
plan remains less than 90 percent funded in all 3 simulations, even though the plan achieved its 
investment return assumption and the employer made all actuarially determined contributions. 
In the higher-returns-early simulation (#56), funded status rises above 100 percent at several 
points during the first 30 years. In the higher-returns-late simulation (#228) the funded ratio 
falls below 50 percent at 14 years but then rises nearly continually for about 10 years before 
falling. It may seem comforting to see that when the funded ratio dipped below 50 percent in 
year 14, future simulated investment returns combined with employer contribution increases 
were so great that they pulled funding up to nearly 100 percent over the next six years. But 
politicians who find themselves in such a situation would have no comfort: they would be faced 
with many years of high contributions and no reason to believe that future returns will be high 
simply because past returns were low. It happens by design in our simulation because the two 
simulations we selected were known to achieve assumed returns by the end of 30 years. 
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Figure 27 Funded status varies dramatically for simulations that have the same compound average return 
 
 
 
Other simulations can produce very different results, including funded status above 100 
percent for extended periods, and funded status well below 40 percent, particularly in 
simulations that do not achieve a 7.5 percent compound annual return in the first 30 years. 
 
It is not just the timing of investment returns and of employer contributions that varies across 
the three runs. The different simulations result in very different values for the cumulative 
present value of employer contributions, as shown in Error! Reference source not found.. (We 
calculate the present value of contributions and payroll using a 7.5% discount rate. Alternative 
discount rates would result in different present-value calculations.) In the higher-returns-early 
scenario (sim #56), the present value of employer contributions over the first 30 years is 9.1 
percent of the present value of payroll. By contrast, the present value is 15.9 percent of payroll 
in the higher-returns-later scenario (sim #228). The present value for the constant 7.5 percent 
scenario falls between the two extremes. Each of these variable-return simulations differs from 
the constant-returns simulation by at least 20 percent, and the higher-returns-later simulation 
is 75 percent more expensive than the higher-returns-early scenario. Thus, the order in which 
investment returns arrive is important, even when the compound annual return is the same – 
high returns early can have a large beneficial impact on overall contributions, while higher 
returns later can have a large detrimental impact. 
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Table 5 Funded ratios, employer contributions, and the cumulative present value of employer contributions vary even 
when compound returns are the same 
 
 
 
What causes the order of returns to matter? Negative cash flow, before considering investment 
returns (i.e., benefit payouts that exceed total contributions), plays a role. When a plan has 
negative cash flow, relative to a plan that does not, investible assets will be higher in early years 
than later. In this case, good returns early will generate more investment income than good 
returns later, because they will be applied to greater investible assets. Required contributions 
therefore will be lower. The interplay between the order of returns, contributions, and plan 
funded ratio can become quite complex when contributions are smoothed; as a result it is 
difficult to understand and predict precisely how contributions and funded status will vary. 
Most plans currently have negative cash flow before investment income and so these issues are 
quite relevant. 
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October 2015) and Michigan State Employee’s Retirement System: Asset/Liability Study (Portland, OR: RVK, Inc., 
September 2012). Also see assumptions of Callan Associates reported in Timothy W. Martin, “Pension Funds Pile 
on Risk Just to Get a Reasonable Return,” Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2016, sec. Markets, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/pension-funds-pile-on-the-risk-just-to-get-a-reasonable-return-1464713013. Callan 
Associates has noted that it sympathizes with public pension funds given the challenges that professionals face in 
achieving assumed returns in the current interest rate environment. 
33 The 16 percent scenario is quite consistent with assumptions of Callan Associates reported in Martin, 
“Pension Funds Pile on Risk Just to Get a Reasonable Return.”  
34 The portfolio mean return and standard deviation at 6.7 percent risk-free rate are derived in such a way 
that each portfolio has a Sharpe ratio of 0.46. This is broadly consistent with what a typical plan today appears to 
assume: it is consistent with an arithmetic mean return of 8.22 percent and standard deviation of 12 percent 
(generating a long-run compound return of about 7.5 percent), and a risk free rate of 2.7 percent. The Sharpe ratio of 
0.46 is higher than what is used or implied in many recent studies, reflecting the optimistic views of public pension 
plans about the return they can achieve with their current portfolio. For example, Novy-Marx and Rauh use a Sharpe 
ratio of 0.4 for the stock market in “The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension Plans,” The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 23, no. 4 (2009): 191–210. We will examine in the next section a scenario in which the 
expected long-run compound return is only 6 percent and the implied Sharpe ratio is 0.335, which is consistent with 
current capital market assumptions discussed earlier and lower than what is implied by public pension fund 
assumptions. 
35When investment returns are variable, the long-run compound return (which we show in the table) will be 
lower than the expected annual arithmetic return. In the model, we draw expected arithmetic returns. We determine 
the appropriate expected arithmetic mean by a widely used approximation formula under which the long-run 
compound return equals the annual expected return minus one half of the annual variance. 
36 To ensure comparability for purposes of the figure, liabilities and the funded ratio in each scenario are 
discounted using a 7.5 percent discount rate for each graph line. 
37 Under the “lower assumed return” scenario, the employer contribution rates need to be approximately 46 
percent of payroll in the first year, and therefore the probability that the employer contribution rate will rise above 
30 percent of payroll at some point during the 30-year period is 100 percent. Under the scenario “invest in riskier 
assets,” in which the contributions are generally much lower, the probability is only 2.5 percent even though 
investment returns are much more volatile. The pension fund under the “good old days” scenario has no exposure to 
this type of risk at all. 
38 The plan would be likely to become overfunded under this scenario. 
39 Ibid. 
